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CLASS WAR IN THE COURTS? RETRENCHMENT 
PACKAGES AND CONTINENTAL FASHIONS (PVT) LTD. V. 
M UPFURIR I A N D  O THERS*
Munyaradzi Gwisai
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade capitalism  has w itnessed a m ajor continuous crisis locally and 
internationally. Such crisis has led to a major re-organisation of capitalism with an emphasis 
on free market policies with accelerated attacks on the working class.* 1
In the field of labour law, such attacks have seen the tightening up of an already strongly 
anti-working class legislative framework,2 as thousands of workers have lost jobs through 
retrenchments.
This attack has not been confined to capital alone but includes the judiciary. In the last few 
years, the courts have been waging a silent but vicious war against the working class. Law 
and its enforcement agents like courts are not neutral social phenomena, but are conditioned 
by the economic base of society.
In spite of their protestations to the contrary, the courts ultimately exist to advance and 
protect the domination of capital over labour. Through the ideology of rule of law they 
foster a false illusion of being impartial social organs of dispute resolution.3
That the contrary is the reality is amply demonstrated by the recent Supreme Court case of 
Continental Fashions (Pvt) Ltd. v. Mupfuriri and Others4 dealing with the issue of severance 
packages on retrenchment.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Matters pertaining to retrenchment are governed by the Labour Relations (Retrenchment) 
Regulations, 1990.5 Initially, parties must seek to reach agreement on the retrenchment 
an d /o r  the quantum  of severance pay at the relevant authority. Where this is not possible, 
the m atter is referred to the Retrenchment Committee, which makes recommendations to 
the Minister of Labour. If a party is still aggrieved, they may appeal to the Labour Relations 
Tribunal.
1997(2) ZLR 405(S).
1. Sibanda A., "IMF-World Bank Impact on Zimbabwe", B. Onimode (Ed), The IMF, the World Bank and 
the African Debt (Zed, London 1989).
2. For instance the Labour Relations (Amendment) Act, 1992 which undermined employment security 
by removing the duty on the employer to have state approval before terminating employment, in 
situations where there are registered codes of conduct.
3. Kiselyov I., State Monopoly Capitalism and Labour Law (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1988).
4. SC 161/97.
5. Statutory Instrument 404 of 1990.
Lecturer, Public Law Department, University of Zimbabwe
n
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In the instant case in which the employer alleged financial difficulties, there was failure of 
agreement at the National Employment Council on the severance package. The matter 
w as re fe rred  to the  R etrenchm ent C om m ittee and the M in ister accep ted  its  
recommendations. Both the employer and employees were dissatisfied with the M inister's 
decision. There was an appeal and cross appeal to the Labour Relations Tribunal. The 
differing positions were as follows.
A. Original Positions at the NEC
Package Offered by Employer:
— Two days pay for every year served;
— One suit for every retrenchee.
Employees’ Position
— Five weeks pay for every year served;
— Relocation allowance of $3 000;
— Notice as per statutory requirement;
— Medical Aid for five months;
— Three suits per retrenchee;
— Re-employment preference for retrenchees;
— Statutory terminal benefits.
B. Minister’s Determination
— Three months severance pay;
— One week's pay for every year served;
— One suit for every retrenched worker;
— Gratuity/pension;
— Effective date, June 30,1996.
C. Employer’s Re-Adjusted Position on Appeal
— Three months severance pay to be reduced to one month;
— One week's pay for every year served to be reduced to three days pay for every year 
served;
— The rest of the M inister's determination accepted.
The Labour Relations Tribunal rejected the employer's pleas of an alleged precarious 
financial situation, holding that in the determination of whether severance pay should be 
paid and the quantum thereof, the ability of the company to pay was not the fundamental 
consideration.6
6. Continental Fashions (Pvt) Ltd v. Mupfuriri and Others LRT/H /53/96 at p 9.
J l m - f II
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The employer appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that the Labour Relations 
Tribunal's position was a fundamental misdirection. It accordingly set aside the Tribunal's 
order and confirmed the M inister's order but subject to a reduction of the figure of three 
months severance pay to one m onth's severance pay.
SEVERANCE PAY: RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE?
The first issue to look at in assessing the issue of retrenchment packages is one of whether 
there is a right to a retrenchment package.
The Labour Relations Act,7 itself does not deal with the matter directly.8 The m atter is dealt 
w ith under the Labour Relations (Retrenchment) Regulations, 1990. Section 3 (2) of such 
Regulations provides as follows:
3(2a) Without any derogation from the generality of subsection (2), an authority shall 
attempt to secure agreement on the following matters -
(a) the possibility of implementing measures to avoid the retrenchment of employees,
(b) if the retrenchment of em ployees is unavoidable -
(i) the phasing of retrenchments over a period of time; and
(ii) the criteria for selecting em ployees to be retrenched; and
(iii) the benefits to be paid on retrenchment, including redundancy or severance 
payments and relocation allowances.
The regulations therefore do not create a clear direct right to severance pay but only place 
a duty on the parties to "attem pt to secure agreement" on the matter.
The issue of whether there exists a right to severance pay has raised controversy in bourgeois 
labour law. On the one hand has been the right-wing ideological camp which has rejected 
outright the existence of such a right. Opposed to it is the liberal ideological camp which 
recognises a limited right to severance pay.
Right-wing Ideologies
In interpreting statutes, right-wing ideologues take a strict literalist position whereby 
statutes are narrowly construed with words given their ordinary grammatical meaning 
unless this operates against the interests of capital.9 D. du Toit10 calls this the "literalist-
7. Chapter 28:01.
8. As pointed out by McNally JA there are only "two passing references to retrenchment" in the Act, 
namely section 5 (1) (e) and section 17(3)(s), which is the enabling provision for the Regulations.
9. An example of this has been that of the whittling down of the jurisdiction of the Labour Relations 
Tribunal ostensibly on the basis that its powers are as literally defined in the statutes. Air Zimbabwe 
Corporation v Mlambo 1997 (1) ZLR 220 (S) (McNally JA); Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe v 
Mazvimavi 1995 (2) ZLR 353 (Gubbay CJ). Indeed the instant case itself is an example of such attack 
on the authority of the specialised labour courts by the formal courts. The Labour Relations Act s92 
(2) makes the Labour Relations Tribunal the final appellate court on matters of fact. Thus in this case 
the Tribunal's determination of whether or not the company should pay a particular level of 
retrenchment package, i.e. a question of fact, should have laid the matter to rest. But the court has 
virtually destroyed this, by a very broad interpretation of what amounts to questions of law, to include 
fact situations thus giving themselves their original jurisdiction. Also see Madhuku L., "Jurisdiction 
of the High Court in Labour Disputes — A Note on Recent Cases", (1995) 12 Zim. L Rev 152.
10. D. du Toit et al., The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (Butterworths, Durban, 1996) p 43.
including - 
(i) . . .
~ ll
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cum-intentionalist" model of interpretation. Such model is extremely hostile to interpreting 
statutes in their sodal-political context as this raises fundamental questions about the nature 
and purpose of law.
It is this model that has enjoyed ascendance in the last two decades consistent with the rise 
of neo-classical schools of thought. It is this right-wing ideological model that is the major 
inarticulate premise underlying McNally JA's decision in Continental Fashions v. Mupfuriri 
and others.
The honourable judge starts off by arguing that "the legislation in respect of retrenchment 
is not very helpful to those required to apply it". This sets the scene for the court to invoke 
its own anti-working class notions and prejudices into the Regulations minimising the 
extent of labour's entitlement to severance pay. As will be shown later this is completely at 
variance with the objectives underlying the Regulations.
Indeed in its overzealous objective to promote the interests of capital, the court assumes 
positions that fly even in the face of the literalist tradition. At page 3 the learned judge 
opines:
'Retrenchment', w hen used in the context of labour relations, means a cutting back of 
expenditure on the employment of workers by reducing their number (The definition 
is mine. There is none in the Regulations).
There is of course a very elaborate definition of the term "retrenchment" in the Regulations, 
which the court chose to ignore. Section 2 of the said Regulations defines the term "retrench" 
as to mean:
to terminate the em ployee's employment for the purpose of reducing expenditure or 
costs, adapting to technological change, closing down or re-organising the undertaking 
in which the em ployee is or was employed, or for similar reasons.
However, the court's action is not accidental. It is the basis on which the court's judgement 
rests. The court substituted its own narrow definition of retrenchment in order to justify its 
creation of a hierarchy of categories or types of retrenchment with differing consequences, 
which is not there in the Regulations.
The court held that in situations where retrenchment arose out of the desire to avoid collapse 
and liquidation of the company, the situation was different from other situations of 
retrenchment, for instance those resulting from mechanisation or mere restructuring. In 
the former case "the well-being of the retrenchees cannot be the only consideration. The 
survival of the company is the motivating consideration..  "u
From such position, the court then catapulted into holding that in such retrenchments the 
survival of the company becomes the chief concern, and therefore its "ability to pay the 
retrenchment package is the ultimate criterion — the bottom line". This therefore marks a 
departure from section 7 of the Regulations which explicitly states the need to mitigate the 
consequences of retrenchment as far as possible. This was different from the position of 
the Labour Relations Tribunal, which, while recognising the financial position of the 
company to pay as an important factor in assessing the severance package, did not make it 
the fundamental consideration.
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Taken to its logical conclusion, McNally's position means that a company which shows 
that it has "virtually  zero cash flow" can be completely excused from paying any 
retrenchment package. After all, its survival is "the bottom line." In other words it means 
labour's claim to severance pay rests on very precarious grounds under the McNally 
schema. Indeed this explains the anti-labour outcome of the instant case.
McNally JA's position is very similar to that adopted by courts of a similar ideological ilk 
in South Africa before the enactment of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. Using such approach 
such courts rejected the notion of a right to severance pay, that had been upheld in earlier 
decisions.12 The right to severance pay was rejected in decisions such as Young & another v. 
Lifegro Assurance Ltd.13 The basis of these cases was to dismiss the assumption underlying 
a right to severance pay, namely that workers acquired proprietary rights in a job. It was 
argued there was no legal basis for such entitlement as workers were duly compensated 
through wages. A claim for severance pay was characterised as one of substantive economic 
interests which is more properly the subject of collective bargaining as opposed to a legal 
right.14
LIBERAL BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY
However, the above ideological positions only reflect a particular version of bourgeois 
ideology and have been attacked by liberal bourgeois scholarship. Contrary to the "literalist- 
cum -intentionalist" m odel of interpretation, the "purpose-seeking" m odel used by 
bourgeois reformist ideologues seeks to "embrace a more contextually-sensitive and value- 
coherent approach to statutory interpretation".15
The underlying rationale behind this being that in order to get the true intention of the 
legislature, the interpreter m ust go beyond the manifested literal intention manifest in the 
words. To do this, the interpreter should "make use of an unqualified contextual approach, 
which allows an unconditional examination of all internal and external sources".16
Such a model reflects the value positions of liberal bourgeois ideologies which seek to 
ameliorate the inherent conflict between labour and capital through concessions to the 
former.17 Such a model of interpretation allows the maximisation of the reformist utility of
12. Such as Ntuli and Others v. Hazelmore Group t/a Musgrove Nursing Home (1988) 9 ILJ 709 (IC); Cele and 
Otheis v. Bester Homes (1990) 11 ILJ 516 (1C).
13. (1991) 12 ILJ 1256 (LAC). Other cases that confirmed this right-wing approach were Bestei- Homes 
(Pty) Ltd v Cele and Others (1992) 13 ILJ 877 (LAC); Hoogenoeg Andolusite (Pty) Ltd v NUM and Others 
(1) (1992) 13 ILJ 87 (LAC).
14. These arguments drew heavily on positions advanced by Cameron, Cheadle and Thompson, The 
New Labour Relations Act (Juta, 1989) 128, wherein the authors severely criticised the Ntuli decision 
for its characterisation of a severance claim as a legal one, when in fact it was an economic-related 
one. See generally P. A. K. Ie Roux and A. van Nierkerk., The South African Law of Unfair Dismissal 
(Juta & Co Ltd 1994) pp 265-271; D du Toit (et al) The Labour Relations Act of 1995 (Butterworths, 
Durban, 1996) p 374; and Grogan J., Workplace Law 2nd ed. (Juta & Co, 1997) pp 153-155.
15. D. du Toit., op. cit at p 44.
16. G E Devenish Interpretation of Statutes (1992) p 36.
17. Rycroft A., and Jordaan B., A Guide to South African Labour Law 2ed (Juta & Co, 1992), pp 115-129.
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paternalistic welfarist labour legislation like the Labour Relations (Retrenchm ent) 
Regulations, 1990.18
Using such a model of interpretation, bourgeois reformist courts have been able to recognise 
a limited right to severance pay. In South Africa, before Young & another v. Lifegro Assurance 
Ltd,'9 the courts fashioned a substantial right to severance pay jurisprudence, following 
developments in England. The courts grounded that right on two main grounds.
Firstly on the "unfair labour practice" concept in the 1956 Labour Relations Act.20 Failure 
to pay severance pay was held to be an unfair labour practice in so far as it adversely 
affected the relationship of the employer and employee and unfairly prejudiced and 
jeopardised the w orker's employment opportunities and work security.
Secondly, a more powerful ground was the one that m oulded the claim in a proprietary 
sense. This route had already been chartered by Lord Denning in Lloyd v. Brassey where he 
held: "A worker of long standing is now recognised as having an accrued right in his 
jo b .. ."21
Once so characterised, severance pay becomes one of right because if the worker had earned 
a proprietary right to her job, then she must be compensated for the loss of the same, due 
to no fault of hers.22
This is a powerful ground of equal application here. In South Africa, such an interpretation 
received legislative confirmation in the form of section 196 of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995 which provides that employers m ust pay "severance pay equal to at least one week's 
remuneration for each completed year of service with that employer". The situation in 
England has also been similar with a w orker's right to redundancy pay guaranteed under 
section 135 of the Employment Rights Act, 1996.
Taking the above, it is submitted that a proper interpretation of the Regulations is one 
which places as param ount and fundamental, the employee's entitlement to severance 
pay rather than one which places emphasis on the position of the employer as was done in 
Continental Fashions v. Mupfuriri by McNally JA. Put in other words it is submitted that the 
interpretation by the Labour Relations Tribunal was the correct one.
18. See for instance Chiworese v Rixi Taxi Services Co-op Society HH 13-93 where Smith J held that a taxi 
driver, whose contract categorised him as an independent contractor, was nonetheless an employee 
under the Labour Relations Act, Chapter 28:01 because to rule otherwise would go against the real 
intention of the Act to protect workers from arbitrary dismissal. See also Nyambirai v National Social 
Security Authority and Another 1996 (1) SA 636 (ZS) where the purpose-seeking model was used.
19. (1991) 12ILJ1256 (LAC).
20. s i  of the Labour Relations Act defined "unfair labour practice" as meaning, inter alia: "an act or 
omission, other than a strike or lockout, which has or may have the effect that:-
(i) any employee or class of employees is or may be unfairly affected or that his or their employment 
opportunities or work security is or may be prejudiced or jeopardised thereby".
21. (1969) 1 AIIER 382 at 383E.
22. See generally P A K le Roux., op. cit. At p 265.
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UNDERLYING LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES
McNally JA's judgement fails to make due cognisance of the underlying objectives of the 
Regulations and the principal legislation. Taken in its whole context, it is clear that the 
intention behind the Retrenchment Regulations is to "prevent unnecessary and wholesale 
retrenchments of employees by employers" and where it is deemed unavoidable to minimise 
the consequences through retrenchment packages.23 Such interpretation is also consistent 
with one of the judicially-acknowledged major underlying premises of the principal act, 
namely to protect and advance the interests of workers.24
Further, section 7 of the Regulations specifically refers to the need to avoid retrenchment 
of employees as far as possible and to mitigate the consequences where retrenchment is 
deemed unavoidable. Sections 9 and 10 reinforce this by making it a criminal offence to 
unlawfully retrench workers and making any such retrenchment null and void.
The amendments to the Regulations further fortify the interpretation that payment of 
severance pay is mandatory under the Regulations.25 There can be no greater deterrence to 
employers from just resorting to retrenchment at the first whiff of economic problems than 
by making a severance claim both m andatory and expensive for the employer.26
McNally's distinction of types of retrenchments through which he seeks to escape from 
this obvious legislative objective is redundant. In the first place no such hierarchy of 
categories of types of retrenchment is found directly in the regulations. The learned judge 
himself admits as much.27
Further evidence that it was not the intention of the legislature to create such distinction is 
found in the am endm ent to section 2 of the regulations by the Labour Relations 
(Retrenchment) (Amendment) Regulations, 1992 (No. I).28 If the legislature meant to make 
the survival of the company the bottom line, then it would not have added the category of 
"closing down".
The distinction that is also made between workers targeted for retrenchment and those 
remaining, with the latter impliedly having the same interest as the employer in minimising 
retrenchment packages in order to save the company and their jobs is not convincing. The 
experience has been that once employers engage on an exercise of retrenchment, they are 
likely to come for the second if not third round, as the current economic crisis bites and
23. per Muchechetere JA, Chidziva and Otheis v Zimbabwe Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. 1997(2) ZLR 368(S). See also 
Prosser and Others v Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company Ltd HH-201-93, HH-673-93 at 3.
24. Art Corporation Ltd. v. Moyana 1989 (1) ZLR 304 (SC); Chiworese v. Rixi Taxi Services Co-op Society HH 
13-93.
25. This is clearly the purpose behind the Labour Relations (Retrenchment) (Amendment) Regulations, 
1992 (No. 1) which create an additional category of type of retrenchment, namely "closing down", 
make it mandatory for the parties to attempt to secure agreement "on the benefits to be paid on 
retrenchment, including redundancy or severance payments and relocation allowances", and in section 
8B stipulate special measures that employers and workers may agree to in order to avoid retrenchment.
26. Grogan J., op. cit. At p 154.
27. On page 3 paragraph 3 where he states "Clearly therefore, although it is not stated in the Regulations, 
the ability of the company to pay the retrenchment package is the ultimate criterion — the bottom 
line."
28. Statutory Instrument 252 of 1992.
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bosses look for the soft targets. It is therefore in the interest of both groups of workers to 
fight hard to resist retrenchment in the first place. Where this is not possible, then to fight 
for the highest possible retrenchment package. This kills two birds with one stone. In the 
first place it ensures that those who are leaving go with a decent package. In the second 
place, the higher the package the lesser the temptation on the employer to go on a second 
round of retrenchment, as it is unlikely that workers targeted then would go on packages 
lesser than those in the first round. So jobs are protected in the long term, or at least it 
allows workers to fight for progressively higher levels of retrenchment packages.
Thus it makes sense for both groups of workers to unite. This means in practice, just as in 
theory, McNally's distinction fails to meet the grade.
It is also strongly arguable that the line of cases in South Africa like Lifegro Assurance Ltd 
which seem to have strongly influenced the learned judge29 are distinguishable from the 
situation in Zimbabwe. In the first place, whereas in South Africa then there was no elaborate 
statutory definition and treatment of the area of retrenchment law other than the definition 
of "unfair labour practice" in the Labour Relations Act, 1956, in Zimbabwe such elaborate 
statutory provisions exist in the form of the Regulations. And as has been shown above, 
such regulations have strong indications on the need to have severance pay made. And in 
any case, the South African Labour Relations Act, 1995 now provides for statutory severance 
pay as indicated above.
Taken to its logical conclusion McNally JA's "ability to pay" criterion makes payment of 
severance pay discretionary in the sense that a company which purportedly shows an 
"inability" to pay can escape from paying anything. This, it is submitted, in view of the 
above is contrary to the purpose of the legislature as shown above.
It is submitted that the free room of manoeuvre or bargaining available to the parties is one 
on the quantum  to be paid and not on the principle of whether any payment should be 
made. To use the "ability to pay" criterion as the ultimate criterion on this basis fails to 
recognise that in paying a retrenchment package, a company is making an investment in 
its future just like any other investment. If the company's chances of survival are so bleak 
as to justify paying nothing to the workers then it might as well file for liquidation as it is 
no longer viable. In either case the job security of labour is not guaranteed.
Indeed the dangers of McNally JA's criterion can be show n in that em ployers can 
misrepresent their actual financial position in order to justify not paying, more so in 
situations where employers are not required to make 100 per cent information disclosure 
of their financial situation.30 The Tribunal had held that the company had failed to make 
due financial disclosure as required by law.31
29. The latest material the court refers to (on p 4) is a 1993 text, namely Riekert's Basic Employment Law, 
2nd Ed) but since then not only has such textbook been up-dated, see Grogan }., Workplace Law 1997, 
op. cit; but the position in South African law itself changed, reversing the then position stated in 
Riekert's. See footnote 14 above for references.
30. As admitted by the judge himself at page 4 and also in Atlantis Diesel Engineers (Pty) Ltd v National 
Union of Metahoorkers 1995 (3) SA 22 (AD).
31. At p 15 LRT/H/53/96.
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DIFFERENCES NOT FUNDAMENTAL
Whilst significant differences exist between liberal reformist bourgeois legal ideology and 
the neo-classical right-wing one, such differences are not fundamental. Whilst the former 
is prepared to buy industrial peace by making some concessions to labour in the form of 
recognition of a claim to severance pay, which the latter rejects, in the end the nature of the 
quantum  of claim recognised as legitimate by liberal ideology exposes its class bias. As 
pointed out both in South Africa and England, the quantum statutorily recognised is around 
one week's pay for every year worked. This is the same quantum endorsed by McNally in 
the instant case. This is peanuts.
This is not surprising in view of the fact that both ideological tendencies ultimately accept 
the legitimacy of bourgeois private property, which is precisely based on the unpaid for 
surplus value created by labour. The demand for a severance pay is a reformist one, which 
simply demands that in the computation of the value of labour power, account be taken of 
the period when the owners of such labour power are rendered unnecessary by the vagaries 
of the market, and that they be paid something whilst they wait to be re-engaged again 
when the economic pace picks up again. It is therefore very similar to an unemployment 
benefit. It is capitalism which in fact ultimately benefits from such a scheme, as it ensures 
that the reserve pool of the unemployed remains fit and ready to resume duty whenever 
called upon to do so.
Currently right-wing elements on the Zimbabwe bench have been able to gain the upper 
hand partly because of the open-ended nature of the Retrenchment Regulations. Because 
the Regulations do not expressly create a right to severance pay in similar m anner to the 
South African and English legislation, such elements have had a field day. It is incumbent 
that the regulations be amended to expressly create a right to severance pay and the amount 
thereof.
Unfortunately the same situation has been repeated in the Labour Relations Bill, 1997. 
Section 20 as read with the Second Schedule of the same dealing with retrenchment replicates 
the regulations, but even drops the express obligation currently placed on the parties under 
section 3 (2b) to attempt to secure agreement on retrenchment benefits including redundancy 
or severance pay. This will only fortify the right-wing bourgeois legal ideology represented 
in Continental Fashions (PVT) Ltd. v. Mupfuriri and Others and characteristic of the current 
Zimbabwe Supreme Court.32
Ultimately, labour's claim to retrenchment pay lies in the very nature of the exploitative 
relationship between capital and labour under capitalism. At a general level, it is morally 
w rong to make workers pay, through loss of jobs and non-paym ent of retrenchm ent 
packages. The economic crisis which leads to economic difficulties and restructuring by 
employers, resulting in retrenchments, is a direct result of the employers' economic system 
of capitalism. Capitalism is a system based on unregulated competition between property 
owners in the drive for increased profits. Inevitably, this leads to economic anarchy and
32. Similar right-wing ideological influence was at play in Chidziva and Otheis v. Zimbabwe Iron and Steel 
Co. Ltd, in which the majority decision of the court in open defiance of the specific wording of sections 
9 and 10 of the Regulations, refused to nullify a retrenchment exercise that was openly in violation of 
the Regulations, on spurious common law grounds of waiver.
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crises of booms and slumps.33 The very bosses who benefit from this system m ust be the 
ones to pay for the inevitable crises of such system and not its victims, the workers.
At a more specific level, as K. Marx amply demonstrated, wages only represent at most the 
average value of labour power and not the value of the product of labour.34 The surplus 
value produced by the worker's labour is expropriated gratuitously by the capitalist and 
forms the basis of his profits and accumulates over time. This puts the lie to the right-wing 
denials of an accrued proprietary right to a job, since in many ways a severance pay 
represents a tiny claw-back on the unpaid for surplus value created by the worker over the 
years.
But to give labour a general right to work and fair remuneration for work done would be 
to eradicate capitalism itself. Thus, within the parameters of capitalism, labour's struggle 
can only be one of recognition of a limited right to severance pay. This is not to say that 
such struggle is not important. It is. But the important point to note is that the recognition 
of such right and the level of the retrenchment package ultimately will not be determined 
in the hallowed corridors of the courts but with the balance of class struggle in the particular 
industry or society, of which the militancy and organisation of the proletariat is central.
In South Africa, militant class action led to the codification of such right under the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995, reversing decades of bourgeois judicial precedents. In recent months 
in Zimbabwe workers who have been prepared to resort to militant class struggle such as 
those at the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and University of Zimbabwe have been able to 
score significantly much better packages than the "norm" recognised by the bourgeois 
courts.35
33. Marx K. and Engels F., Communist Manifesto (Progress Publishers, Moscow 1969).
34. Marx K., Wage, Labour and Capital (Bookmarks, London, 1996) p 23.
35. For instance, University of Zimbabwe workers who embarked on a militant demonstration got a 
retrenchment package in July 1998 of:
1. severance pay three months salary;
2. notice pay three months;
3. gratuity, one and half months' salary for each year completed from 1994;
4. one month's allowance for each year completed from 1994;
5. relocation allowance of four thousand dollars;
6. pension as per rules and regulations.
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